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W

h e n Canada decided to contribute
an expeditionary force to support
the British in August 1914 a commander
had to be named. While the Conservative
Minister of Militia and Defence, Colonel
Sam Hughes, thought that he himself
might be the most appropriate leader of
the 1st Canadian Division, the British
Commander-in-Chief, Lord Kitchener,
disagreed. As Hughes contemplated several other
candidates, one officer he did not consider was
Major-General François-Louis Lessard. 1

Lessard had strong supporters. He was "held
by many to be the most accomplished officer in
the Canadian Forces" in 1914, wrote Colonel A.F.
Duguid, first h i s t o r i a n of the C a n a d i a n
Expeditionary Force. 2 Premier J.P. Whitney of
Ontario advised Prime Minister Robert Borden
that "in my opinion Major-General Lessard
should command the First Contingent...I think
most people will agree with me that he is the one
o u t s t a n d i n g m a n for the position." 3 J.F.
Cummins, writing in the Canadian Defence
Quarterly shortly after the First World War,
suggested that Lessard had been the best
candidate due to his age, rank, experience,
efficiency and knowledge of both the francophone
and anglophone military establishments. 4 But,
despite the protests of some of his supporters including the Chief of the General Staff Sir
Willoughby Gwatkin 5 - Lessard received no
overseas command, not even a brigade. Instead,
he was made Inspector-General for Eastern
Canada. This was an important position, but it
was certainly not the front-line command role
hoped for by Lessard.

Some historians have suggested that
his age made him ineligible for the
position of senior commander overseas. 6
Aged 53 in August 1914. he was still
younger than the leader eventually
selected, Major-General E.A.H. Alderson.
The 5 5 - y e a r - o l d A l d e r s o n h a d
considerable experience on active service,
and had commanded Canadians in South
Africa. Hughes preferred him over two other
British officers he had considered (the 61-yearold Earl of Dundonald, and the 69-year-old
Major-General Reginald Pole Carew), and
Kitchener approved the choice.7 The commander
Hughes later selected to lead the 2nd Division,
the famous Western Canadian Major-General
Sam Steele, was ten years older than Alderson!
Neither Lessard's age nor his rank prevented
Sam Hughes from naming him to an overseas
command. As Lessard also had experience
commanding troops in South Africa (as did
Steele), why was he not considered for a
divisional command?
Attempting to analyze the decision-making
process under Sam Hughes is not easy. The
considerations that lay behind each appointment
could be very complex, or else very simple.
Hughes sometimes could make non-biased
appointments of outstanding individuals perhaps most notably Arthur Currie to command
the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade in 1914 - but
being a friend of the Minister and a Conservative
were often sufficient. Was Lessard a victim of this
arbitrariness, or were there other reasons? A look
at Lessard's military experience is necessary
before reaching any conclusions.
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Lieutenant-Colonel F.-L Lessard at the time of the
South African War.

He acquired his first experience of active
service during the North-West campaign in 1885.
As the cavalry's role was limited to protecting
supply lines, however, Lessard's group never
came under fire, and their main battle was
against boredom. An even greater battle against
boredom was to be joined in 1893 when
Lessard's cavalry corps, which had recently been
renamed the Royal Canadian Dragoons, moved
to Toronto. Promoted lieutenant-colonel to
command the Dragoons in July 1899, Lessard
received high praise from the Military Gazette
for his enthusiasm and hard work.10 He was thus
well placed to play an important role in the
Canadian contingents that would soon sail to
participate in the South African War.

Lessard was born in Quebec City on 9
December 1860. His father, Louis L. Lessard,
was Secretary with the Permanent Building
Society, and François-Louis, known to his friends
as Louis, attended St. Thomas's College. He
served in a number of local militia units, and
then joined "B" Battery of the Quebec Garrison
Artillery as a gunner, and in which he became a
second lieutenant in 1880. In 1884 he joined the
Cavalry School Corps of the Permanent Force at
Quebec, and was promoted captain in 1888.
Although he had deep roots in the francophone
community, like some of the francophone
political, economic, and military leaders of the
time - such as Sir Wilfrid Laurier and RMC
graduates Percy Girouard and P.-H. D. Casgrain8
- he was not entirely out of place among the
British elite. Some soldiers under his command
in South Africa thought they recognized a French
accent when he spoke English, while others
identified it as British!9

On 12 October 1899 forces from the Boer
republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free
State invaded the British Cape Colony and Natal,
helping London justify an anticipated war in the
area. Ottawa had already been wrestling with the
question of possible Canadian participation for
weeks, and showed at least as much opposition
as support for the idea. But once war was
declared the Canadian government almost
immediately announced a contribution of 1,000
volunteers. Over 6,000 additional volunteers
would join them during the following two and a
half year struggle, mostly paid for by the British.
The Canadian Prime Minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier,
emphasized his support for the empire's fight for
humanity, religious freedom and civil rights such as securing the right to vote for the
Uitlanders (disenfranchised subjects of the
Crown living in the Boer colonies); but many
critics suspected that London sought liberty only
for white Anglo-Saxons, 11 and was merely
attempting to protect its economic interests in
South African diamond and gold mines.
Canadian support for the war was far from
u n a n i m o u s , and n o n - a n g l o p h o n e s were
understandably among the most hesitant. Had
francophone opposition to the war been as fervent
as some accounts claim, however, the support of
someone like Lessard for the cause would be
difficult to explain. 12 In fact, it appears that
support for the war in English Canada has often
been exaggerated and support in French Canada
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underestimated. 13 In the early months of the
struggle La Presse and La Patrie both had
articles critical of the British position, but they
carried far more that were favourable. A leading
opponent, Henri Bourassa, admitted privately
that he could not understand why FrenchC a n a d i a n views of imperialism remained
"unsettled" and support for Laurier so high.14 The
francophone religious, business, political, and
military elites were strongly behind the cause,
as long as the war remained not a fight for AngloSaxon economic or political dominance, but a
fight for humanity, religious freedom, and civil
rights. This was the cause Laurier sought to
emphasize, 15 and it was this cause that Lessard
intended to defend when he offered his services
and encouraged his francophone compatriots to
volunteer with him.16
Lessard would be disappointed when, in
accepting the Canadian offer of troops, Britain
specified a preference for infantry over cavalry.
With no hope of embarking with his own mounted
regiment, Lessard volunteered for special service
with the First Contingent, consisting entirely of
infantry, which sailed at the end of October 1899.
He shared a cabin with his old friend from
Quebec, Oscar C. Pelletier. 17 After his arrival in
South Africa Lessard joined the staff of the
commander of the British cavalry, Sir John
French, and he gained some valuable experience,
most notably during the relief of Kimberley in
February 1900. He would soon have the
opportunity to put this to good use in command
of his own Canadian mounted battalion.
In December 1899, London accepted a
second Canadian contingent. This left on three
ships in January and February and consisted of
two battalions of Canadian Mounted Rifles (750
men), and three batteries of Royal Canadian Field
Artillery (539 men). When they arrived in late
March, Lessard assumed the command of the
1st Battalion CMR, with the Westerner T.D.B.
Evans as his second-in-command. The 2nd CMR
was under the command of L.W. Herchmer, with
Sam Steele as second-in-command, both from
the North-West Mounted Police. However, Steele
soon left to lead Strathcona's Horse, and Evans
replaced Herchmer in May 1900. 18 Another
change was in the name of Lessard's unit. As its
manpower nucleus of trained soldiers came from
the Royal Canadian Dragoons, Lessard argued

successfully for the unit to be known under this
designation. Although some of the recent
volunteers who now found themselves Dragoons
considered the request "rather absurd," 19 the
British were i m p r e s s e d , seeing Lesard's
persistence as a defence of the regimental system
and a commitment to building the traditions that
lay at its heart.
Lessard was anxious to take his battalion into
action when it arrived in South Africa, too
anxious for the British who would have preferred
a few more weeks of training. He nonetheless had
his wish immediately, and led the Dragoons in
operations in the Cape Colony, the Orange Free
State, and the Transvaal. By the time his battalion
left South Africa in December it had ridden 1,700
miles and had fought 27 separate engagements,
including an impressive victory at the battle of
Coetzee's Drift in May.20 After fighting disease,
the elements, and the enemy, many looked
forward to the end of the war. But after the
Transvaal's capital, Pretoria, fell in June, the role
of mounted infantry became more important than
ever, as the Boer mounted commandos adopted
a guerrilla-style war.
Horsemen were now essential for escort and
reconnaissance duties, and to participate in
raiding parties against Boer commandos. The
task was not easy for the Dragoons, as the
number of men and horses had fallen to less than
half of the original strength. Some had been
assigned new roles while others had been
wounded or become ill.21 Lessard himself was
injured in an accident and spent most of August
recovering. After a battle at Witpoort Pass, he was
returning to camp in the dark over rocky ground
when his horse fell on him, spraining his thigh.22
After his return he assumed command of 1,400
hundred troops stationed in the town of Belfast,
200 kilometers to the northeast of Pretoria.
During his two weeks of command in midOctober, Lessard reportedly adopted a more
aggressive stance t h a n his predecessors,
organizing and sending out a large number of
expeditions into the surrounding countryside. 23
Despite occasional confrontations with Boer
commandos, these fighting patrols, which
L e s s a r d c o m m a n d e d with skill, were
characterized most often by monotonous
routine. 24 Days were long, nights were cold, and
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police actions applying the British "scorched
earth" policy - the destruction of farms suspected
of hiding saboteurs, or expelling women and
children from their homes in order to clear the
countryside of Boer supporters - were scarcely
glorious or inspiring. The most notable exception
was the rear-guard action at Leliefontein in
November 1900.
Major-General
H.
Smith-Dorrien,
commander of the 19th Brigade at Belfast, led
an expedition to disperse a Boer commando
laagered in the area of Witkloof on the Komati
River, 200 kilometers to the south. Leaving
Belfast on 6 November, the advancing troops
included a section of the Royal Canadian Field
Artillery with two 12-pounder guns commanded

gun covered the withdrawal of the second, with
the troops formed in a semi-circle on each side.
Under increasing Boer pressure, Lessard had to
evaluate when to use the guns to support the
rearguard and when to retreat. At one point when
the 12-pounders were threatened, Morrison
remembered Lessard galloping up and shouting
"for God's sake Morrison save your guns! They
are coming down on our flanks."26 Eventually the
gunners made good their withdrawal, thanks to
the assistance of three Dragoons - Sergeant
Edward Holland, who provided covering fire with
his Colt machine gun, 27 and Lieutenants H.Z.C.
Cockburn and R.E.W. Turner who rushed to help
stave off the off the Boer attackers. In the process,
the leader of the Boer commando, commandant
H.R. Prinsloo, and the commander of all Boer

Lieutenant-Colonel
François
Lessard
(left),
commanding
officer of the Royal
Canadian
Dragoons, with two of his lieutenants in South
Africa.

by Lieutenant E.W.B. Morrison, and about 95
Dragoons. 25 After the force reached the Witkloof
area, the strength of the Boer forces and his own
lack of mobility convinced Smith-Dorrien to
return to Belfast. The following day the forces
began to withdraw while the Dragoons and
Morrison's guns, all under the command of
Lessard, were left behind to cover the retreat.
This rearguard action, which took place near a
farm called Leliefontein, resulted in three of the
four Canadian Victoria Crosses awarded during
the war.
As the Boers realized that the British were
retiring they raced to reach the strategic ridges
that dominated the escape route. Evans and his
CMR played a crucial role in keeping open the
line of retreat. As for the rearguard itself, Lessard
ordered a staggered withdrawal, with each
element supporting the other's movement. One

troops in the area, General J.C. Fourie, were
killed, and the Boer attack lost momentum.
Holland, Cockburn, and Turner were all later
awarded VCs for their actions.
Lessard h a s received high praise from
historians for his role at Leliefontein. Carman
Miller, perhaps the leading Canadian authority
on the war, has written that,
Lessard was superb: courageous, decisive, cool,
and insistent, he remained with the rearguard.
During the worst of the battle he rode along the
ridge, keeping a general view of the engagement,
anticipating moves, devising tactics, reassigning
troops to shore up weak defences, making
difficult decisions, and encouraging his men. 28

Brereton Greenhous affirms that "the column was
saved from heavier casualties and the possible
loss of the guns by Col. Lessard's tactical sense
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and his initiative." He added that the engagement
had important results, as, with the death of
Prinsloo, the number of Boer attacks on rail lines
in the area decreased. 29
The British heaped praise and awards on the
veterans of Leliefontein. In addition to the three
VCs, Morrison won the Distinguished Service
Order, and Private W. Knisley of the Dragoons
the Distinguished Conduct Medal. The British
may have gone somewhat overboard. Some
members of the battalion believed that the fight
had not been that exceptional. One Dragoon wrote
that when the awards were announced "there was
strong criticism made by many of the men as to
why all of these honours had been awarded in
the fight at Leliefontein on November 7."30 But
certainly the Canadians had fought well, and the
critics perhaps underestimated the consequences
of failure by the rear guard, as well as the
importance that the British commanders placed
on saving guns. 31
Leliefontein was one of the Dragoons' last
actions. Shortly afterwards they boarded ship to
return to Canada. As their commander, Lessard
had acquired important military experience,
learning from problems (most notably the need
for appropriate reinforcements of men and
horses), and from the successes. 32 Most seem to
have appreciated his qualities. Morrison echoed
the sentiments of others when he wrote that
during the fight at Leliefontein "we were holding
our own nicely on the rearguard, thanks to Col.
Lessard's excellent disposition of his force."33 One
officer who had served under him wrote that "as
a soldier there was none better and we all loved
him."34 Lessard was praised, along with his men,
by the British Commander-in-Chief Lord
Roberts, by Sir John French, and by SmithDorrien.35 And along with most commanders of
colonial units, he was awarded a Companionship
of the Order of the Bath (CB). Thus one would
expect that Lessard's experience in South Africa
would have weighed heavily in his favour when
command positions were being assigned for the
Canadian Expeditionary Force in 1914.
Praise for Lessard has not been unanimous,
however. The historian Brian Reid has accused
him of being overly aggressive at Leliefontein
when positioning the guns, rattier than retreating
more quickly. Reid adds that "his galloping about

the battlefield coupled with his shouts to
Morrison leave the i m p r e s s i o n , p e r h a p s
unjustified, that he did not have a grip on the
battle."36 In Lessard's defence, it should be noted
that many in his unit had become noticeably
impatient with the long periods of inactivity and
sought bolder action. Morrison remembered
Lessard complaining in October 1900 in
"vivacious style" that "my men, they know how
to advance all right, but they do not know how to
retire. You cannot get them out of a fight."37 He
may have concluded that to order his men to
retreat at this critical point of the battle would
have undermined their morale, and instead he
endeavoured to bolster their known preference
for aggressive action.
Reid notes that while Lessard's concern for
maintaining good relations in his unit made him
a popular leader, this does not necessarily mean
that he was effective. Reid suggests that the
decision in 1902 to name Evans, not Lessard, to
command a later contingent of mounted troops,
the 2nd Regiment CMR, indicates that some
questioned Lessard's earlier performance. 38 On
the other hand, it is possible that authorities
preferred a Westerner for this latter unit. At least
half of its strength came from the West, and the
governor-general, Lord Minto, had earlier
idealized Sam Steele and the Western riders,
while questioning the ability of the professional
Canadian cavalry in letters to British officials.39
It is also significant to note that Reid considers
the RCD "the most effective Canadian unit to
serve in South Africa, and among the best on
either side."40 As commander, Lessard is entitled
to share some of the credit, particularly when it
appears that the most severe criticisms of his
leadership seem to have come from a single
source: Major-General E.T.H. Hutton, General
Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia from
1898 to 1900.
In October 1900 Hutton, who had departed
his position in Ottawa the previous February to
take up a British command in South Africa, wrote
privately to Minto t h a t Lessard, "though
personally brave enough, lacks confidence in
himself in action and upon any emergency - and
naturally fails therefore in inspiring confidence
among those under him. He is also lacking in
judgment." 41 This opinion came a week before
Leliefontein. The following year Hutton again
53
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Lessard's two chief critics were the Minister of the
Militia, Sam Hughes (left, pictured in 1904), and
Major-General E.T.H. Hutton, General Officer
Commanding the Canadian Militia, 1898-1900.

criticized Lessard's performance, telling Minto
t h a t w h e n E v a n s w a s r e c o m m e n d e d for the CB
Lessard h a d originally b e e n r e c o m m e n d e d for
the less prestigious C M C "It w a s not altogether
an oversight for E v a n s is the best man," H u t t o n
explained, "but it would never have done u p o n
g r o u n d s of expediency for E v a n s to have a CB
a n d Lessard only a CMG." In the s a m e letter
H u t t o n n o t e d t h a t a t least one Dragoon w a s
critical of Lessard's leadership in crisis. 4 2 These
opinions, coming from s u c h a senior figure, could
very well have harmed Lessard's chances of being
selected to c o m m a n d C a n a d i a n s in the First
World War, a l t h o u g h they do n o t seem to have
b e e n all t h a t widely s h a r e d at the time t h a t they
were offered. 43
Probably an even greater obstacle to
Lessard's c h a n c e s , however, were the problems
e n c o u n t e r e d in S o u t h Africa by S a m H u g h e s

himself. H u g h e s w a s a very e n t h u s i a s t i c
s u p p o r t e r of the w a r effort a n d h a d s o u g h t to
raise his own contingent. He q u a r r e l e d with
H u t t o n , who a p p r e h e n d e d "trouble" s h o u l d
Hughes ever serve with British officers. 44 When
the First Contingent sailed - with Lessard listed
as "attached for instructional p u r p o s e s " a n d
quickly finding a place with the British - Hughes
was "attached for passage" and not recommended
for military service. 45 After m u c h effort,46 Hughes
found an appointment with the British, b u t w a s
soon ordered h o m e for violating o r d e r s a n d
publicly criticizing his superiors. The experience
d e e p e n e d h i s prejudice a g a i n s t professional
soldiers - w h e t h e r British or Canadian. 4 7
After t h e w a r , H u g h e s b e c a m e t h e
Conservative militia critic a n d very clearly
expressed his preference for the n o n - p e r m a n e n t
active militia over the P e r m a n e n t Force. W h e n
he b e c a m e Minister of the Militia in 1 9 1 1 , he
immediately b e g a n to e x p a n d t h e role of t h e
volunteer citizen-soldier (who could cut t h r o u g h
"red-tape") at the expense of the Permanent Force
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soldiers ("bar room loafers"), whom he believed
should be relegated to instructional roles. 48
During this period Lessard, who had become
adjutant-general,49 the staff officer responsible for
the organization of the forces, was equally clear
about his support for the Permanent Force. He
had several confrontations with the new minister,
most notably in April 1912 when Hughes
attempted to promote himself to the rank of
major-general.50
In lining up with the Permanent Force against
Hughes, he also placed himself on the side of the
British military establishment in Canada, which
had concerns about the new minister's approach.
The governor-general, the Duke of Connaught,
for example, reported that Hughes' "treatment
of the officers of the permanent forces has caused
grave discontent." Hughes could hardly have been
impressed with how famously Lessard got on
with the British, and by the end of 1912 he had
been replaced as adjutant-general by Hughes'
Tory friend Victor Williams, and sent to a "lesser"
post in Toronto, the command of Military District
Number 2.51
L e s s a r d h a d r i s e n in the military
establishment during a period in the late 19th
century when several leaders - especially British
professional soldiers on loan to Canada - were
encouraging greater French-Canadian
participation. When the war in South Africa broke
out the call to arms clearly had greater appeal
for anglophones, and no more than four percent
of t h e 7,368 C a n a d i a n v o l u n t e e r s were
francophones, a percentage well below the
proportion of French-Canadian officers in the
C a n a d i a n c o n t i n g e n t s . Those who h a d
encouraged francophones to enlist did not see
the obstacles - most obviously the need to speak
English, and the service's very marked proEnglish orientation. Indeed, from 1902 to 1914,
the percentage of French-Canadian officers in the
militia declined constantly.52 Hutton, for example,
who as General Officer Commanding had been a
strong proponent of a French Canadian presence
in the Canadian militia, felt betrayed. 53 Hughes,
on the other hand, had never hidden his
francophobia, and the South African War served
only to intensify it.54 Some historians have seen
Hughes's anti-French sentiments as sufficient
reason for Lessard's not being considered for a

position of command. 55 But Hughes had even
more reasons to dislike the career officer from
the Permanent Force.
Personalities and politics were important.
Prime Minister Borden considered Hughes an
able, energetic minister at times, but was
convinced that "on matters which touch his
insane egotism he is quite unbalanced." The
appointment of officers was one of these matters.
Borden regretted t h a t Hughes's "peculiar
methods" created so many problems during the
initial recruitment period for the Canadian
Expeditionary Force in August-September 1914.
"His intense vanity and a rather vindictive temper
which developed during this period, contributed
to the difficulty of the situation," Borden
remembered. 56 According to his biographer,
Hughes's preference for loyal Conservatives could
be even stronger than his preference for Canadian
officers over British officers.57 Nothing is known
for certain of Lessard's politics, although the fact
that his career prospered under the Laurier
Liberals and stalled under the Conservatives may
suggest an allegiance to the former party.
Whatever the case, when Hughes began looking
for friends and Conservatives to appoint,
Lessard's name does not appear to have been on
his list.58
Hughes's animosity towards Lessard was
confirmed during the war. He certainly made life
difficult for Lessard during the early months of
the conflict. In November 1914, Hughes publicly
blasted Lessard's practice mobilization of
Toronto militia units and the following month,
apparently dissatisfied with Lessard's militia
inspection service that had been established by
order of the Governor-General, Hughes set up a
second inspection service to override it. In both
cases Borden sided with Lessard, as did the
Toronto press. 59 On one occasion Lessard visited
Europe to report on the recruiting system, and
undoubtedly took some pleasure exposing certain
problems, such as the lack of coordination
between Canadians, the British and the French.60
As with a large number of Canadians, Lessard
was becoming increasingly upset with the
minister and stated privately: "I am out for this
man's [Hughes's] blood. He is disgracing Canada
and jeopardizing relations with the Imperial
Government and the Army."61
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When Hughes was eventually forced to resign
in November 1916 Lessard was considered as a
replacement. However, he was passed over for
this and other positions, and the role for which
he is perhaps best remembered during the First
World War, when he is remembered at all, is as
leader of the military intervention in the Quebec
riots of 1918. 62 During the last year of the war,
from February to December, Lessard carried out
another unpopular mission when Gwatkin
appointed him to command Military District 6
at Halifax. He was praised for his handling of
the difficult administrative task of applying
Ottawa's plans to reduce the Halifax garrison (in
order to free up overseas reinforcements), and
increase the fighting efficiency of the fortress. 63
Lessard retired to live in Toronto in 1919, and
died there in 1927.
It would seem that Lessard's performance in
South Africa should have increased his chances
for an overseas appointment in 1914. He had
displayed both aggressiveness and restlessness for
action in the earlier war, which were precisely
the sort of qualities that Hughes admired. Indeed,
few Canadians had such impressive credentials
as Lessard in 1914. Hughes nonetheless had no
shortage of reasons for disapproving of the
Francophone Catholic Permanent Force cavalry
officer who circulated so comfortably among the
British. A rough ridin' militia Tory like Sam Steele
was more his kind of man. 64
Lessard may or may not have been the most
appropriate candidate for a divisional command
in 1914. Nonetheless, an evaluation of his career,
particularly his performance in South Africa,
s u g g e s t s t h a t h e m e r i t e d more s e r i o u s
consideration for a senior position with the CEF
than in fact Hughes' personal and political
phobias allowed him.
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